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NILE WATERS MANAGEMENT AND LINKS TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND FOOD SECURITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

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AT DFAIT, 125 SUSSEX DRIVE OTTAWA, ONTARIO, CANADA

ORGANIZED BY
TAG EL KHAZIN-SUBSAHARA CENTER
OTTAWA, CANADA

The views expressed in this report are those generated by the roundtable participants. They are not necessarily reflecting any views of the donor organization or the event organizers.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The current asymmetry in military power and economic and political might argues forcefully against the success of any Nile Basin Initiative, and yet paradoxically the high-stakes interdependence of all the stakeholders is also driving the initiative forward. This is because the Nile is so essential to the current and future development of each country in the basin. The Nile Waters present an opportunity for an "enclave approach" where shared needs and interests are used as a wedge to open better cooperation in all areas.

Those who wish to improve the management of the Nile Waters and reduce the potential for conflict in the Nile basin must first of all take into account several key factors that mitigate against significant progress.

Egypt has taken the view that "what is ours is ours and what is yours is open for discussion.". *Realpolitik* has entered into the behavior of the regional powers, with governments now covertly promoting violent rebel groups within each other's territories. Egypt's reluctance to give up its current share of the waters means changes are required not only in how food is produced and what varieties of crops are cultivated, it also means that a radical re-thinking in policy focus, negotiating strategy and in the type of projects that need to be promoted and successfully implemented. The explosive growth in both the population and food requirements mean an increased potential for both local and regional conflict. That fact combined with a shrinking water supply means the region urgently requires alternative lifestyles and policy options.

Escaping from this quandary means a shift in focus and in scale from the international and multi-lateral to the community. Yet any successful model must always be at least in part regional in scope, especially in terms of moving food freely within and across borders during times of distress. Given the many political and economic constraints, a major emphasis needs to be placed on small-scale water management for food production, irrigated crops and the promotion of better health. The successful promotion of ground-up development begins when projects reach down to those closest to the land, respecting the rights of local people and empowering their communities to control projects because they have the greatest stake in their success.

The history of internal and regional conflicts requires turning the page perhaps by shifting to an economic focus from the current political deadlock. The history of failing to consult the populace

and particularly minority groups at the national and regional level must change. Any solutions that emerge must spring from widespread engagement, land reform, and be based in a healthy civil society and broad-based ownership of the process and the outcomes. The discussion must be open, practical and focus on a bottom-up rather than top-down approach; on local rather than mega-projects.

While participants in the Nile Basin Brainstorming Session had a sense that the current initiative has been bureaucratic and technocratically driven, operating just "under the radar" with few practical outputs, there was also a strong sentiment that the Nile Waters require a governance framework acceptable to all the stakeholders. The consensus of participants was that successful management of the waters requires an independent, de-politicized, multilateral management of the water system. Local and national interests must be considered and fostered, but any effective water management process must consider the total basin and be conscious of the delicate interaction of sun, earth, water, and vegetation: what affects any one aspect of the eco-system impacts on all. The US-Canada International Joint Commission (IJC) represents the most compelling model for the management of the regional waters.

Canada has an asymmetrical relationship with the US in terms of economic and political force as well as the size of population, yet the IJC works well. Only twice in its history have members split along national lines. Members work in a principled way and the key has been the political independence accorded to its members. The ethos has been not to seek the greatest benefit for the individual members or the individual state, but rather to seek the greatest good for all governments and citizens concerned in any issue. Such a model could to be adapted in the management of the Nile Basin Watershed.

Prosperity and security go hand-in-hand, and business must be encouraged to participate in any successful initiative. This is not just a question of incentives, but one of confidence and security.

The need for practical economic solutions and new alternatives in agriculture and water management is clear. The region needs to focus on raising less water-intensive crops and also to devote fewer resources to cattle and other livestock. It is also important to consider that while technology can reduce wastage, it cannot change the fact that the plants themselves must consume the same amount of water. Improved crop rotation, the development of more drought resistant varieties, the introduction of newer varieties of plants, especially newer varieties of trees, are all measures whose collateral benefits include a reduction in soil erosion and improved crop yields.

Canada has a role to play in this initiative as an honest broker that "leaves no footprint." The asymmetries in the current situation make it possible for one power to prolong a conflict. Mediating a conflict often means a third-party plays some kind of role in balancing out some of those asymmetries. Currently, raw power and technical expertise favour Egypt as the dominant regional player. This has enabled them, as the downstream beneficiary, to reap most of the benefits of the vast water flow even though 85% of the water comes from Ethiopia.

For the weaker states to make headway, disinterested but influential third-party states need to intervene as they did to break the impasse on the law of the sea negotiations. There needs to be a shift from the current sandbagging of regional powers and internal national elites in all of the states and a move from zero-sum thinking and negotiating strategy to win-win strategizing in negotiations. The key question is how to deal with the region as a whole to produce benefits for all: if not equal, at least a net positive for all. Another key is to implement thorough risk assessment before and during project planning, management and negotiations. Success demands a minimum level of buy-in from the senior political level and a delegation of authority to negotiators. To move ahead, an integrated communication and education strategy must be woven into the process. Changing traditional mindsets and focusing on sustainability and conservation are of paramount importance in reversing desertification and implementing more effective alternatives. The dialogue must begin at the community level and the Civil Society level, expanding the network and breaking down the barriers between competing groups by integrating self-interest through mutual interdependency

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Special thanks go to Dr. Vern Redekop for his valuable input and consultations, and to Shawn Houlihan who made a knowledgeable presentation to the roundtable. I also wish to thank Dr. John Young for the paper he contributed throwing light on the Ethio-Sudanese relations. My thanks go to Pam Thompson for her interest in the event, and for her useful ideas and contribution in the facilitation of the event.

I also wish to thank all the participants who readily accepted to chair the different sessions and contributed valuable insights in their introductory comments.

Finally special thanks to Joe Morris who facilitated the event and assembled the scattered ideas and comments in a coherent and useful way.

I wish to stress that the 25 participants get the primary credit for the results of the event that we all hope would be useful to the Center and DFAIT.

Tag El Khazin
Subsahara Center

FOREWORD

The Nile River draws ten nations into a relational system based on a common water resource. From water as a resource flows food, energy, industry and life.

The Nile is more than a water resource, however. It has a life and a history all its own. Like other great rivers like the Yangze, Tigris, Euphrates, Ganges and Saint Laurence, it was pivotal in the evolution of sedentary life, agriculture and civilization. It was woven like a dominant pattern into the culture of the peoples living along its banks.

The Nile Basin takes in the northeastern quadrant of Africa. It is a vast region supporting hundreds of millions of people. The land of the Basin has been stained over the last half century—stained with the blood of more than three million people who have lost their lives through violent deep-rooted conflicts in which machetes, bullets and food deprivation all became weapons of death. Populations have been moved around, persecuted and otherwise victimized. Territory that was once agricultural land has been flooded and pastures have been shaved of vegetation by lack of water. Time collapses in the psyches of those implicated so that the traumas of the past decade, century or even millennium seem to have occurred yesterday.

In a context in which the life-giving potential of the Nile is of great significance; its water capacity is limited and the people in its arms know how to fight and kill, it is no small challenge to find a constructive approach that will satisfy everyone. It takes wisdom, insight and collaborative relationships.

Given the need and the challenge, it is of utmost importance that people with different pieces of the puzzle gather for dialogue so that each essential piece finds its place. Expertise on the land itself, on the peoples of the region, on water management, conflict resolution and the Nile itself all need to be at the table. And they were. This report gathers the insights of such a gathering, called to take up the complex challenge of dealing with water use issues in the Nile Basin.

The tone of the gathering was positive; people were building on each other's ideas. The dynamics were synergistic and creative as the differing approaches stimulated new ideas for everyone. And the results, though preliminary, were hopeful.

Tag El Khazin, the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development and the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade are to be commended for organizing and sponsoring respectively this important first step. The record of what happened is itself a piece of the puzzle, to be added onto by subsequent events, initiatives and processes.

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INTRODUCTION

The roundtable was organized to generate options for the consideration of Canadian policymakers to support their strategies and policies toward the Horn of Africa. (See annex I for details of the themes of the roundtable). Thirty-five participants were invited; 27 accepted the invitation; two sent regrets and 25 participants attended. (See annex II for the list of participants). A short 12-page resource document was prepared by the organizers and circulated to the participants ahead of the event. (Please contact the organizer if you are interested in receiving an electronic copy). The day and the event were sectioned into seven dialogue sessions and three brainstorming sessions. (See annex III for the Day's Program). The seven dialogue sessions were each chaired by a different participant. The three brainstorming sessions were each facilitated jointly by a participant assisting the event's facilitator, Mr. Joe Morris.

The body of the final report is made up of two main chapters and a third concluding chapter. Chapter one summarizes the findings, comments and recommendations of the general dialogue of the seven sessions. Chapter two summarizes the options generated as a result of the three brainstorming sessions. Chapter three is the general recommendations and follow up.

This second chapter is made up of five sections. They are:

- Food security
- Conflict Management
- Good management of Nile waters
- Agenda for possible dialogue between the five countries of the Horn of Africa
- The role of civil society

Short General Recommendations were drawn as thematic areas. This was summarized as themes that could be enriched by the participants through the Internet once the draft report was ready (which has been done) or as a partial frame for future activity within the recommended follow up. The final section of the report is in the recommendations for follow-up.

In addition to three annexes mentioned above, attached at the end of the report is a synopsis of the four presentations made by Dr. Vern Redekp on conflict management, Shawn Houlihan on the general regional impact of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), Bernard Taylor on possible measures to be taken by the Horn countries to reduce their dependence on rain-fed food production and Tag El Khazin on south Sudan: scenario for self-determination and impact on Nile Waters status quo.

CHAPTER ONE

NILE WATERS ROUNDTABLE
SUMMARY OF THE SEVEN SESSIONS OF DIALOGUE

In his introduction, Vern Redekopf referred to the Arabic word "barakat" and the Hebrew word "baruch." In both cases, the meaning is "blessing", and water has taken on the additional connotation of expanding people's options and opening up new possibilities. In traditional symbology, water has the dual role of healing and making life flourish. The irony is that while water is the source of life, it could also be the source of possible conflict in Africa. One of the roles of the roundtable process and any resulting steps must be to identify who are the people at risk of conflict because of water and what are the resources required to evoke the "mimetic power of blessing" from water. As Tag El-Khazin reiterated, the purpose and focus of the roundtable was not politics or hydrology but rather to look at the ways and means to reduce conflict and increase food security through good management of the Nile Waters.

Inequity is evident today in the use of the waters. Egypt's cropland is 100% irrigated, Sudan's is 15% irrigated and Ethiopia's only 2% irrigated; yet Ethiopia is the source of the majority of the waters. There was broad consensus among the participants that no resource document for a limited purpose event can adequately address the complexity of the issues, especially regarding the roots of the various conflicts in the Horn of Africa and the legal complications of rights and ownership of water. As several said: "In 2001 we need to agree not to argue over details" or dwell on past history; "We need to take a different perspective," and to look for practical solutions, while remembering that the equity issue forms the background to the current disagreements over Nile Waters.

Any collaborative effort by the Nile Basin Countries and their supporters must aim to reduce poverty, and get the entire Nile Basin region to work together to generate prosperity. Security is key in bringing individuals together to create value, improve trade and increase investment. The general feeling was that "If you improve the economic outlook, you can reduce conflict."

The experience of the Canadian and American International Joint Commission (IJC) was considered an illustrative model to study and benefit from the lessons learned. As Michael Veschler pointed out, Canada has an asymmetrical relationship with the US in terms of economic and population sizes, yet the IJC works well. Only twice in its history have members split along national lines. Members work in a principled way. The key has been the political independence accorded to members. Experts have been asked to take off their employer's hats and all witnesses, expert or not, have been accorded immunity from prosecution in all jurisdictions. The ethos has been not to seek the greatest benefit for the individual members or the individual state, but rather to seek the best interest of the governments and citizens in any issue.

Collegiality is a second key. Working groups take a principled, problem-solving approach. Public

involvement and input is sought and recommendations have been readily acceptable because the IJC has not pursued initiatives contrary to the public consensus, even when all technical, environmental impact and engineering studies have proven positive.

This model was seen as a way ahead, illustrated by the strong consensus that the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) moves forward with bilateral and multilateral projects and agreements, that a joint international and regional commission be formed, that members be made politically independent and that consensus and input from all segments of society be sought. Confidence building as well as peacebuilding are a key, and "small actions cannot be underestimated for building joint interest."

Kate White referred to the "wand of engagement": the movement to action and to engagement with other citizens and experts from across borders that can produce a great synergy. The "root-level engagement of citizens is the first step in a wider engagement." Queen Elizabeth I was cited for an instruction she gave during the Irish wars to "kill all the harpists" - the cultural voices. Without a voice, the people can be crushed; so "do not discard all the hats – hydrologists, even lawyers have something positive to contribute to the dialogue." Engaged citizens are essential to the success of this initiative, but "people remain engaged if they feel their engagement makes a difference."

It was noted that public consent was not sought at the time the Aswan dam was built. The seeds for potential conflict would be laid when the citizenry is left out or swept aside. In this case, the Sudanese and Egyptian governments reached their agreement on the Nile bilaterally but without the consent of the Sudanese citizens that were affected by the construction of the dam. The result was the mass re-location of affected peoples to environmentally hostile areas, the inundation of historical sites and lands, and people resorting to living on contraband trade for subsistence. The impact on women was notable in the reduction of their work opportunities. Different participants of the roundtable stated again and again that the potential for conflict increases when the public is not consulted.

There is imbalance in the control of the basin's water. Control of the water downstream is far stronger compared to upstream. The result has been devastating to the upstream countries. Poverty, less water, more pollution and wastage, degradation of the land, inadequacy in food production have occurred at the same time as population growth has continued to explode and the power and economic strength of Egypt over the region has increased. The result has been the concept of "weak states struggling to find resources and services for their people." There seems to be no legal recourse by the "weaker countries" to international law because "International law is weak in terms of water rights." It was also felt by several participants that arguing over 'rights' is probably not the most productive way to go.

Most of the previous discussions between the "producers of water" and "users of water" stalled on the eternal conflict over who should have power over the waters. An attitudinal issue may be the crux here: the tendency has been to view conflict as a zero sum game: "More for them must mean less for us." A paradigm shift needs to occur where there is a "win-win" objective and where stakeholders focus on "creating value rather than claiming value." One of the most

positive suggestions towards changing that mindset was to create regional resource sharing or pooling and to develop sharing and pooling banks in times of need. The creation of a "water university" in combination with the NBI/IJC proposed earlier would facilitate that pooling of talent and resources and focus them when and where they are needed.

A key source of conflict has been the sense of victimization, notably in Ethiopia: "If you internalize, you create distrust." One destructive behaviour has been for parties to covertly support rebel groups in each other's countries. *Realpolitik* seems to be entering the approaches of all the governments. Unstated was where that approach could lead – with Eritrea's economy lying in ruins as one clear illustration.

The rhetoric of water is the number one policy issue for Egypt and Ethiopia and is certainly high for Sudan; however, the NBI has, so far, been a technocratic and bureaucratic process accomplished "under the radar so far." Yet concerns were raised during the roundtable not only about how the process has bypassed the people of the region but also as to the feasibility and usefulness of the subsidiary bilateral or multi-lateral projects. While the intention to spend $120 million on developing a Shared Vision, $49 million on an Equatorial Action Plan and $30 million on an Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Plan is laudable, it was noted that $80 billion would be required for development to have a serious impact (the UNDP Executive Programme of 1989 estimated between $40-60 billion).

The crux of the whole issue is the question of what will change as a result of all this renewed discussion between Egypt and the Horn countries regarding the Nile waters. As one participant stated: without the cooperation of Egypt, "we are back to square one." In the past, Egypt has categorically said "no" whenever discussions of usage and redistribution of water has come up. As another participant put it, Egypt's position has seemed to be "whatever is ours is ours; whatever is yours is open for discussion."

Conservation issues were also discussed during the dialogue and the focus was on the practical: plant more trees, preserve the soil; improve irrigation techniques and practice, and above all, preserve the water and minimize its losses before it enters the Nile basin outflow. Certainly, using water more efficiently and raising crops where and when it is most efficient to do so is key. It was noted, for example, that it is six times more expensive to grow wheat in Sudan than in Ethiopia. Producing electricity where it can be produced most efficiently was also emphasized; however, as one participant stressed, pooling of resources is perhaps the best way to maximize the effectiveness of a regional crop rotation strategy. Making such a program work would require, for example, trading one country's oil for the food crop that another country can produce more efficiently. This would mean implementing an effective regional barter and resource pooling system.

It was generally felt that the common long-term enemy is not each other or even politics but desertification - the Sahara is eating up the best arable land at an alarming rate. Apparently, the Sahara claims an additional 10-20 km per year and the expansion of the desert has been obvious in our lifetime. One participant stated that the Canadian experience and expertise could be adapted to

help out in both the riparian and non-riparian states. It would seem that Canadian experience with the dustbowl and efficient irrigation in dry areas such as the Okanagan valley or the American experience with its shrinking south-western aquifer, salinification of arable land and the overuse of key rivers such as the Colorado would fit this agenda. For example, it would be fruitful to conduct regional and international exchanges to see how the Americans have used technology like screens to reduce evaporation over their southern rivers or how African farmers have used hedges to reduce erosion or drip irrigation to minimize the waste of water during irrigation.

Tag El-Khazin pinpointed that a key source of conflict has been the interaction of different cultures and lifestyles and either ignorance or unwillingness of peoples to adapt to global technological, geographic and demographic forces.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATION OF THE SEVEN DIALOGUE SESSIONS

At the conclusion of the day, each of the participants was asked to make one last point to contribute to a future road map. The points raised were diverse but summed up many of the thoughts and concerns expressed earlier. Several of the participants stressed the Canadian role as an honest broker and suggested that Canada continues to take an active role and keep the interest in the Nile Basin as part of or parallel to the NBI in matters in or related to the 'Facilitated prioritization process and formulation of priority subsidiary action programs' (TOR) of the NBI. Some of these thoughts came out in emphasizing a need to focus on diplomatic initiatives and quiet diplomacy. Canada can take a greater role because of the position of minimum bias with which it is held in the region. This would not just be Canada's role but also an imperative among the stakeholder states. It could also involve engaging the African community in Canada in this dialogue and particularly in the development of further planning and implementation for the Nile Basin Initiative.

The focus on quiet diplomacy was also evident in the suggestion that Canada continue to act like CIDA and "leave no footprint." One participant stressed that Canada desperately needs to articulate effective and do-able trade policy to allow the private sector to jump in where it can do some good. Whether by encouraging business participation or by encouraging bottom up development, there was a consensus that success meant exploring new possibilities and options, creating alliances and using existing organizations as a basis for moving ahead. There was also a strong expression as to the positive potential contribution of Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and civil society in the process and the need to approach NGOs to augment the NBI. It was also stated there was a strong requirement to prepare a way for business. Money is a great coward but essential to any progress.

One participant commented that DFAIT needed to "bite the bullet" and commission an organization to organize a roundtable where all ten countries including Egypt could be united in the discussions over issues like conflict management and food security. In supporting this point, another participant added there was also a need to get technical expertise involved as well as the political representatives of the Nile Basin countries. A final but important word was the need for more "democratization" in the Horn. The impact of civil society and engagement can be magnified when powerful elites share the vision with all facets of their society.

CHAPTER TWO

SUMMARY OF THE OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATION GENERATED BY THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE THREE BRAINSTORMING SESSIONS.

The Roundtable dialogue and brainstorming sessions addressed the following three questions:

1. Possible impact of the Subsidiary Action Plan for Eastern Nile (ENSAP) on conflict and food

2. What measures and processes relating to the Nile waters can be adopted by the Horn countries to mitigate the risk of conflict current or future?

3. What measures, processes and projects relating to the Nile waters can be adopted by the Horn countries to reduce their dependence on rain-fed food production without creating tension?

The seven dialogue comments and recommendations that resulted from addressing these three questions have been reassembled into the following five themes with which the 25 participants were particularly concerned.

FOOD SECURITY

Any discussion of food security in the Nile Basin must begin with the fact that there are over 300 million people living in the Nile Basin region and that this number is growing every day. Egypt's reluctance to give up any of its current lion's share of the waters means changes are required in how food is produced and what varieties of crops are cultivated. Above all, the admixture of explosive growth in the population and a rapidly rising demand for food to shrinking water supply means the region urgently requires alternative lifestyles and policy options. The peoples of the region need to exchange antiquated traditional methods for more modern efficient techniques. The people desperately "need to share Best Practices and Right ideas on water study and find out what is going on elsewhere."

Food security involves managing the interaction of many independent variables. It also means the recognition of the "human right to water" and a "more equitable distribution" of the water supply, for without more water or water better managed, the current vulnerability of the people to the slightest hazards would continue. All of these issues are connected: the security of food supply, the

lack of sharing in the region and the need to find an equitable way to share.

Two analogies informed the roundtable discussion: the first was the well known expression "give me a fish, I eat for a day; teach me to fish, I will eat all my life." The second was Dr. Vern Redekop's story about some people who are given a supply of food but with extremely long spoons to eat it with. They cannot feed themselves with these spoons, but eventually they learn that if they feed each other they can eat. The first story illustrates that learning to do something for oneself is much more valuable in the long term than becoming dependent on charity. The two stories illustrate the need to work together and pool resources to deal with the current overwhelming crisis.

Comments made by two participants reflect this train of thought. The first suggestion was to create a "water university" to generate new ideas, to pool skills, and to create technologies attuned to the region's needs. The second thought is that additional food production and more timely food distribution could result if a regional food bank were developed – an International Joint Committee (IJC) made of the Nile Basin countries could administer the program and deliver the food to the needy in the region.

Most of the other food security issue comments were of a highly practical nature. The region needs to focus on raising less water-intensive crops and also to devote fewer resources to cattle and other livestock. It was noted that the same amount of water produces 10 times as much grain by weight as meat (Note: 10 pounds grain produces 1 lb of beef; 5 lbs of grain produces 1 lb of pork; 2 lbs of grain produces 1.8 lbs of chicken - so efficiency varies considerably). It is also important to consider that technology can reduce wastage, but it cannot change the fact that the plants themselves must consume the same amount of water.

Improved crop rotation was another suggestion: for example, millet in dry years, corn in wet years. Participants felt that agronomists need to develop more drought resistant varieties. Newer varieties of plants, especially newer varieties of trees, need to be introduced whose collateral benefits include a reduction in soil erosion. Perhaps fellowships could be created and funded for African agronomists and hydrologists to work and develop new techniques out of Agriculture Canada or the Canadian Food Agency labs. The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) needs exchange of ideas and the promotion of best practices in areas such as irrigation (i.e. drip irrigation). Perhaps alternatives to agriculture such as aquaculture could be introduced in the region. This is an alternative that does not remove water from the basin and thus reduces the potential for conflict with Egypt.

One participant also noted the need for land reform: the basis for prosperity is private property. The collateral benefit would be an increased concern about and consciousness of impacts as farmers realize that what they and others do will directly impact on their property and productivity.

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

It was emphasized by several participants that prosperity and security go hand-in-hand and that there is an economic basis to all the conflicts in the Horn. The issue is always about something not shared and about too few resources being stretched too thin.

The consensus was that much would be gained by a change in focus to an economic rather than a political focus. The benefits of such a focus greatly outweigh the water management issue in and of itself. The potential benefits include better health, land preservation, increased energy production, reduced poverty, reduced conflicts, improved cleanliness, increased food production - immediate quick-hit benefits, not just future gains resulting from expensive mega-projects. It was felt that a focus on the small, the local and the economic empowerment of the individual would bear great fruit. Some participants were uncomfortable with the negative connotation of "poverty reduction." "A reduction of poverty is also a result of prosperity"; this is not "trickle-down" but a reflection of bottom-up economic growth.

The results could be exponential: progressive reduction in the number of conflicts. A shift in the regional mindset must take place: from the attitude "I have something to lose" to "I have something to gain" in a win/win exchange. The shift must occur from just trying to hold on to what we have, to capacity building. To achieve this, it is essential to raise the issue above the political domain and above narrow national interests. The emphasis must be placed on a spirit of reconciliation such as post-WWII Europe or South Africa after apartheid. Projects need to visibly and tangibly construct and improve lives and be creative, not just "claim" a redistribution of ever-shrinking existing revenues or investments. There needs to be a focus on problem solving through small steps and inclusiveness.

The key question is how to deal with the region as a whole to produce "benefits" for all: if not equal, at least a net positive for all. Another key is to undertake thorough risk assessment before and during project planning, management and negotiations. Decision trees need to be prepared with sufficient granularity, with "what-if "scenarios and with contingency plans prepared to prevent discussions from bogging down. There also needs to be a minimum level of buy-in from the senior political level and a delegation of authority to negotiators. It is essential to "identify the participants up front and empower them to make commitments and decisions." If they cannot be empowered, then send the actual decision-makers and "commit in advance to actions and alternatives."

GOOD MANAGEMENT OF NILE WATERS

There needs to be a region-wide body to manage the shared waters, and roundtable participants were taken greatly with the Canada/US IJC model. The first question posed was: "Is there an opportunity for an INDEPENDENT multi-lateral commission?" Other comments confirmed this sentiment: to "separate the management of the Nile waters from the states"; and to "adopt a bipartisan model." Several participants affirmed that good water management "needs independence from governments"

and "any water management commission must be independent and above individual national interests."

It was noted that taking the *Sudd* in south Sudan into consideration, there is lots of water – "sharing ought not to be a hardship." The Nile is already very efficiently managed; it even has world-class water management in place: every litre is used from 3 to 8 times. The problem is that limitations are already being reached on use and efficiency. Thoughtful allocation of water in the region is the key to good management, whether at the local level or at more senior levels, from the individual to the community all decisions have an ultimate impact on the management of the Nile waters.

Good management of the Nile Basin requires a focus on sustainable resource use and an understanding of the inter-connections between land use, (de) forestation, ground water and solar energy. The issue of desertification is pre-eminent. People create pockets of desertification by mismanagement of the land: the combination of overgrazing, deforestation, and lack of fuel create a vicious circle. There needs to be a massive re-education of the rural people so that they do not cut down the replanted trees, allowing the trees to do their job of holding the soil. The Israeli example was cited approvingly, and affirmed that it is possible to make the desert bloom. Achieving successful re-forestation and replanting must also start with the "buy-in of rural people." Buying-in to land reform and equitable ownership of the land can lead to more responsibility and greater concern about the effects of traditional practices.

The Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto links high third-world levels of poverty with the lack of clear legal definitions of property. Land is held; it is not owned; "it has become what is called 'dead capital'." To quote Peter Holle, land ownership "allows for collective effort; ownership of enterprises can be shared by hundreds, each of whom can cash in his or her share without jeopardizing the business. Without a decentralized system of ownership, with legal protection of transactions, economies remain trapped in inefficient, localized webs of transaction."

To move ahead, it is essential, not only to involve the public in the discussion, but also to promote environmental education from the local level up. Above all, individuals must see the interconnectivity of solar, soil, water and land reform: if there is no ownership, no interest, people will remain insensitive to concerns about the proper management of the whole resource across the whole region.

To move on, education and broad-based involvement in decision-making is imperative, as is the awareness that there is disparity in the information available for informed decision-making and in how well ideas are communicated. Conservation measures, alternative technologies and strategies, reduced wastage, reforestation, more effective irrigation practices are all integral to good water management. The preservation of marshland for wildlife, as well as the cultivation of forests and shrubs between fields means retention of the soil, reduced evaporation and erosion, and better crop yields in the long term. Cofferdams to reduce run-off would be one type of small local project with major benefits particularly in Eritrea where very little of the water reaches the Nile anyway.

AGENDA FOR DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE FIVE COUNTRIES OF THE HORN

It was noted that in a dialogue, individuals often have two very different world-views and different connotations for the same words. Clearly there is a need for values clarification in the broad sense of the word as well as a need to build a common vocabulary and a common framework of understanding to deal with perceptions and issues. This is especially so because, as one participant said, "We need to talk about principles... principles must underlie discussion."

Education and the need for improved communication were therefore stressed throughout the session. A reduction in tensions could well be promoted by using the available media to spread awareness and to promote common goals. Shared media break down the differences between groups, making the alien and the unfamiliar less threatening. The "opportunity exists to share expertise (but) opportunities also exist to build local involvement," by "promot(ing) self-interest and manag(ing) by level of interest and appropriate responsibility." Getting to that point will involve "impartial conflict resolution / mediation" to break down the barriers created by centuries of mistrust.

Citizen`s engagement (not just involvement) is essential, particularly the "need to consult traditional indigenous knowledge base." The region needs to develop a dialogue approach, because there are too many cultures brushing up against each other. Identity is as important as oils and water and a crucial issue in assimilationist countries. Changing or evolving the culture, lifestyle and customs is essential to moving ahead. Yet this must not be done without respect for values. It was strongly stated that the people of the region need to be listened to and respected. Yet where behaviours are destructive they need to evolve; for example, cultural lifestyle effects such as traditional use of charcoal is highly wasteful. Dried animal dung has exactly the same benefits and is less environmentally destructive in terms of de-forestation. It is also important to understand that "people negotiate from fear of loss much more than hope for gain," so confidence building is essential. There is a need to develop local capacity for participation within and between ethnic minorities as well as between both men and women. To achieve this paradigm shift requires conflict resolution experts, skilled facilitators and mediators to help educate and assist in project design and implementation phases.

A key question was posed at the end: is irrigation of more land up stream the same source of potential conflict with Egypt as damming the Sobat in Upper Nile? The short answer is yes: "Any diversion is a potential source of conflict." This was followed by a more distressing question: If more equitable sharing is not an option, where are the opportunities (and if there are none) why are we even discussing this? The answer seems to be to look for alternatives that do not reduce the flow in the basin, and to promote small local projects rather than unwieldy mega projects.

The agenda seem to demand a focus on practical impacts. It also looks to be a "sequence issue" (what order to do things) to get the political involvement moving. Institution-building requires resolution of some of the key political issues, so it was considered essential to "focus on consensus building internationally." However the difficulty of getting to consensus is exacerbated by the absence of strong and definitive international law in the area of water rights. This

ambiguity leads to conflict. While there is a need to strengthen international law, this cannot come unless the requirement is driven by the largest economies or transnational forums such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund or other influential international agencies. The range of international waters eventually extended from two to twelve to 200 miles and ultimately to the sea shelf around continents because major powers were willing to enforce their demands and not just because the world court was willing to make new law.

ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The concern for and interest in the role of civil society came out as the most paramount preoccupation of the participants. It emerged in every one of the themes of the event. There was an underlying sense that if cooperation is lacking, there is a danger of war over or triggered by water sooner rather than later. That sense is evident when participants are still asking: Who owns the water? Who has a right to the water? And even more so, what will change with any current initiative? Will Egypt agree to forgo its current 65% share (net after evaporation) and if not, what will the results be? If a cautious Ethiopian first secretary can say: "We do not want to beg anymore," you know there is strong potential for a deepening conflict.

The meeting was strongly in favour of ground-up, local, civil society based development: "We need to engage communities themselves." "We need to move to local management – if not, there is a danger of re-instituting conflicts." There is a "need to TRULY involve citizenry in the development, implementation and evaluation of all projects." Projects (at all levels) will "produce confidence building – if (they) are properly managed." "There is (also) a danger of 'cash driven' actions": mega-projects are prone to going over budget and consuming limited resources. They also lead to donor control or over-weaning influence on projects. Mega-projects lead to cultural displacement that could increase the potential for conflict. One example provided was pastoral-nomadic cultures versus rooted agricultural communities in Sudan, conflicting in sodbusters versus ranchers' scenario. However, it was also noted that "various peoples and cultures can learn from each other."

A "Governance Framework" is essential in this discussion, especially given the strong gut-feeling that "politicians should not participate" and that it would be dangerous if there were a lack of consultation with the people. Engagement was the by-word: engagement that "builds an institutional capacity," that "develops interest, (and) encourages outside investment, trade and development." Engagement that "helps individuals and groups solve their own problems." Engagement leads to "community level resolution of conflicts." Engagement "respect(s) the integrity of lives and comes down to adopting a 'don't blame, listen to each other' frame of reference."

CHAPTER THREE

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS AND FOLLOW UP

There were general recommendations, the strongest two recurring themes being the need to engage civil society and to stress the importance of education and training and the engagement of educators in the Nile Basin Initiative. It was emphasized that "the African 'brain drain' has been a source of loss," so making use of these resources in Canada and elsewhere is an important consideration in finding a way ahead. It was also recommended that business groups be involved in the initiative and in developing alternatives such as exploiting deep ground water in areas of Horn countries away from the proximity of the Nile Basin.

Participants felt the right level of government needs to address the right issue to achieve the right impact. Participants also stressed the need for info-tech-networking. The Internet can spread the message to insular communities while at the same time recognizing that radio for public education in the rural regions is not used enough. Engaging the strongest regional powers to look at alternatives rather than closing down the debate was also mentioned as a first principle.

FOLLOW-UP

During the event, the breaks and in networking and debriefs after the event, it was strongly recommended by many participants that follow up would be essential. The proposed areas of follow-up recommended were:

- To gather participants from all ten countries of the Nile Basin for dialogue on the findings and options of the July 3 roundtable and other emerging issues. This would avail the opportunity for both civil society and decision makers from the Horn to look into the agenda and ways of working together and of looking into impact assessments of any project(s) on food security and conflict management. A two or three day roundtable was seen as appropriate.
- To do a seminar on the Role of Civil Society and their engagement in the Nile Basin Initiative. This could be designed to bring NGOs from the region and Canadian NGOs and consultants to dialogue together on means and ways and constructive techniques of engagement.
- To do a workshop on measures to be taken to prevent cash-driven approaches to developmental projects. This workshop could bring together official and civil society actors from the region, Canadian businesses and experts as well as the ICCON partners to generate precautions and recommendations and draw a safe road map for going about development projects.
- To develop an activity/event aimed at the Canadian public, its civil society institutions and the Canadians and immigrants with origin in the Horn to develop awareness about the Nile Basin, its predicaments, and its opportunities and start an advocacy program for the noble contribution of Canada in its patronage and support for the NBI.

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS

Introductory comments made by Shawn Houlihan for the session " NBI: Overview of general regional impact"

INTRODUCTION

The following text does not attempt a comprehensive or definitive analysis of the topic. Indeed, such a challenging topic would require far greater knowledge of hydrology, the Nile in particular, as well as the geopolitical and socio-economic conditions in the sub-region. Rather, for the purposes of facilitating brainstorming on the role of the Nile in conflict management in the Horn, I present to the group a useful analytical tool that is often used as a starting point in conflict analysis - *the conflict triangle*.



The three points of the *conflict triangle* are (i) *Situation*, (ii) *Attitudes* and (iii) *Behaviours*. "**Situation**" refers to the objective aspects of what bring parties into conflict. "**Attitudes**" refers to the more subjective attitudes, perceptions or beliefs parties have, particularly to each other or on specific issues, experiences, world views, etc. "**Behaviours**" refers to how the parties act -- for example, whether tension tends to turn to violence and retaliation or to some form of "conflict mediation" mechanism such as those operating in established democracies (courts, parliaments, etc.) and various international regimes (e.g., WTO). The premise is that all three dimensions of conflict need to be considered in order to properly analyse and to develop an appropriate and effective response to a conflict. A positive (or negative) change in one dimension can start a process of change in the other, which results in a momentum toward conflict de-escalation (or escalation).

I will now present a "first sketch" of my application of the conflict triangle to the topic at hand - *Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa and the Nile Basin Initiative*, with the expectation that the other participants in this brainstorming exercise will be able to start filling in the issues with their more in-depth knowledge and expertise. My main emphasis is not on the Horn of Africa so much as the *Eastern Nile Basin*, which includes Egypt and the two Horn countries of Sudan and Ethiopia, as well as Eritrea (though the latter entails less than 1% of the total Nile flow).

i. Situation

There are several aspects that need to be taken into account.

a. High Stakes Interdependence. This is one of the preconditions for a conflict to exist; otherwise it is relatively easy to ignore each other. The Nile is on a very short list of priorities, if not the highest priority for the political leadership in Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan. The countries of the Eastern Nile Basin are interdependent simply because the Nile is a transboundary river, and more specifically because the Nile is so important to the current and future development of these countries. The Nile is, or is envisioned to be, key for them to be able to better feed themselves, for commercial growth, for electric power, etc. It is to a considerable extent whether or not they find ways to better manage the Nile system - individually but also collectively - that will determine their futures in terms of food security, erosion and desertification, human settlement, and poverty alleviation generally. In the meantime, populations are growing rapidly, poverty is worsening or threatening to worsen severely; opportunities are being lost. We all know that poverty and competition over resources is a prime situation for conflict - within and between communities and at the international level. In short, the stakes are extremely high.

b. Asymmetries. Another important dimension to understand is that of certain important asymmetries in dealing with the Nile Basin. Asymmetries are very important in conflict analysis -- they often make it possible for one party to prolong a conflict; mediating a conflict often means a third party playing some kind of role in balancing out some of the asymmetries (it could even mean simply providing technical expertise, which was important, for example, in the Law of the Sea negotiations).

Asymmetries that I am aware of include the following:

** *Raw Power* - The military and political power of Egypt is clearly superior to the other countries. While there may be clever ways to temporarily balance, minimize or keep it in check the simple fact is never lost.

** *Expertise* - Again, Egypt is a world-class power when it comes to water issues, whereas the other countries in the Nile Basin are far behind. This is one of the issues to be addressed by the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), under human resources development. In terms of conflict, this asymmetry further weakens the other countries in their ability to deal with the technical complexities. It also can, under many different scenarios, lead to a kind of frustration and even aggressive *behaviour* by both the "weaker" and the "stronger" party (in terms of negotiation style if nothing else). Both the level of and asymmetries in expertise are dimensions that have to be appreciated. Some observers have noted that it is a good thing that the asymmetry runs this way -- that the downstream country has the superior technical expertise, because if it was the other way around the overall imbalance would be worse; the upstream country would have the water and the ability to do what it wants with it (Ethiopia has neither its own technical ability nor the financial capital for large scale Nile developments).

** *Water Flow and Usage* - As we all know, to date Egypt is by far the main beneficiary in the use of the water, while 85% of the flow actually comes from Ethiopia, which is reaping relatively far less benefit so far. The food situation in Ethiopia is a desperate one, and it is hard to envision a solution that does not include increased use of Nile waters. And the Egyptians know that population growth is going to present a major challenge for them. The situation in Sudan is similar, though the potential for conflict is probably not as immediate. Any development on the Nile (irrigation, hydropower, etc.) will have an effect on the timing, level and control of flows for the other countries, though I understand there are many more opportunities for cooperation than are being exploited at present. At this point the parties are treating the situation largely as "zero sum". In negotiations methodology we refer to moving from a zero-sum approach of only "claiming value" ("this much is mine, not yours") to one of "creating value". The idea of "Creating value is that if parties explore their full range of interests and the full range of possibilities it may be possible to come up with more creative solutions whereby both (or all) win more than they would by not negotiating. Creating value is one of the basic premises of the NBI. This requires an excellent job on all the technical parameters and possibilities, as well as getting the parties to include additional considerations. For example only, hydroelectric development in Ethiopia could present major opportunities for Egyptian engineering and construction firms. The NBI has tried to move the focus away from the more narrow view of equitable *use* of Nile waters to that of equitable *benefits*. This is expected to provide more opportunity to "create value" and increase cooperation.

Technical assistance and capacity building projects to create an enabling environment at the Basin-wide level





International Law. Depending on your perspective, there are holes in the international law as it is applied to the Nile. As far as the

Egyptians are concerned, the 1959 treaty is part of international law and Ethiopia is bound by it. But Ethiopia never signed the Agreement and sees it as unbinding and that it is manifestly unfair. Clarifying and settling the basic legal framework is absolutely central to viable long-term Nile Basin cooperation, and thus for peace within the sub-region. It is part of the crossbeam that connects the NBI "Shared Vision" to the pillars it plans to use for establishing a cooperation mechanism (see diagram). Whether this gets settled in the near future will be part of the balancing act that the NBI leaders will be doing in order to maintain a momentum of confidence building.

d. Weak States. Weak states are defined, very broadly, as those which can not consistently command the levers of power required to make and carry out their strategies and policies, and to build a critical mass of legitimacy required for stability. Clearly this is an issue, to varying extents, for Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan. The latter has been embroiled in civil war for most of its independent existence; Ethiopia and Eritrea are still in the early stages of nation building to the extent that these have to be considered experiments. The recent major war between the latter two is a case in point. Ironically, the sudden deterioration of their relationship has caused a sudden change in each of their relationship to the Government of Sudan. Whether this will be good for cooperation in the Eastern Nile Basin, or just another short-term shift of unstable relationships among weak states, remains to be seen. This is one of the underlying dynamics of all political processes in the region. It is also important to remember that this issue is also relevant to parts of the Equatorial Nile Basin, which is the other half of the overall NBI -- manifestly so in DRC, Rwanda and Burundi.

e. Internal National Dynamics. Somewhat related to the weak state issue, it has to be understood that there is a complex array of interests re the Nile in each country, whether they are ethnic-, political-, geographic- or economic-based (often all). There will also be urban-rural tensions, for example. These issues have a profound influence on the positions and interests of those who come to the negotiation table, and have to be very well understood by the NBI leadership.

f. International Environmental Issues. The Nile is important to global environment and climate. I raise this point simply to note that policies and projects on the Nile are going to be subject to the consideration of other powerful stakeholders. It will be interesting and important to watch how that plays into the dynamics of the relationships within the Nile basin, and its own process of attempting to increase intra-Basin cooperation and development.

g. Complexity and Uncertainty. All of the foregoing comments point out the complexity and uncertainty of the *situation* -- and there are many more. The shear number of issues and actors, let alone the high stakes and generally difficult working context all create underlying complexity and uncertainty. Indeed, this is a case where complexity and uncertainty are themselves independent factors. I only point to this in order to emphasize the extent of the challenge, and the scope of the response we have to consider. On the other hand, complexity can also create more potential for creative leadership.

ii. Attitudes

a. *Different Interpretations of Law and History*. Attitudes toward each other and the different "world views" generally, permeate the way the countries do business with each other. For example, it is not hard to discern among Ethiopians a feeling of victimization -- that the Egyptians and international community have not treated them fairly. Attitudes of victimization can be seen as a general phenomenon that influences our behavior.

b. Zero-Sum Game. This can be seen as more a matter of attitude than as an objective fact.

c. Distrust. For a wide range of historical reasons, many for which Nile issues have been at the center, there is more distrust than trust, especially between Ethiopia and Egypt, and probably more by the former vis-à-vis the latter. This is, of course, all influenced by the *situation* factors outlined above, ranging from technical expertise to international law and historical experience. Changing the level of (dis) trust is at the center of the NBI's strategy to incrementally build trust and buy-in from key players in each country.

d. Nationalism. This may be the single most important attitudinal issue. It was asked earlier this morning - Is it possible to love of river? Clearly, the Nile is part of the very identity of many if not all Sudanese, Egyptians and Ethiopians (less so Eritrea). This makes issues on the Nile *ultra-sensitive*. Imagine an Ethiopian leader being accused by opponents of "giving away" their Nile. It wouldn't matter how untrue this was, the emotional, nationalistic factor is one that can be easily used for shortsighted political ends, even to stimulate war, coups, etc. Manipulation of nationalistic sentiments has been the instrument for sparking and prolonging so much of the violent conflict that the world has witnessed in the post-cold war period. This dimension and the others above, all combine for a kind of *cognitive bias* that permeates all attitudes and interpretation of others' actions, positions, etc. If we are to be locked into a situation where patriotism is equated with a rigid zero-sum stance, the potential for cooperation is limited.

iii. Behaviors

a. Rhetoric. One of the first issues that a mediator will often try to address is the kind of communication the parties send to (and receive from) each other. Improving the use of rhetoric -- e.g., instead of nationalistic rhetoric that accuses and blames the "other side" for all the problems -- can be a key factor in building confidence and giving room for at first a small number of experts or leaders to work on solving problems. Clearly there is lots of rhetoric on the Nile. It can be seen in the newspapers and be heard throughout the social life in the region. The NBI seeks to create a viable forum that rises above the rhetoric and hopefully eventually changes the messages that the leaders (politicians, academics, editors, etc.) present to each other and their populations.

b. Geopolitical and Military Calculations. It has been common practice for the countries to support the armed or unarmed opposition in the others. The Sudanese support for radical Islamic

groups in Egypt is one of the latter's primary considerations in their bilateral relationship; but the Nile is never far from the core of Egypt's calculations of strategy and tactics when dealing with Sudan. Ethiopia, Sudan and Eritrea have all traded places in supporting each other's rebel movements in the past several years. The question for sub-basin cooperation is whether we can foresee a time where the long-term positive benefits of peace and cooperation (possibly with the NBI being a key part of that change) are the decisive factors in their calculations of geopolitical relations. The Nile is not the only factor, but it is a critical one for this sub-region to become one of cooperation rather than conflict.

c. Buy-in and Leadership on NBI.

Clearly the types of governments in this region means that key elite constituencies, including the military, have to support the NBI in one form or another. Given the massive challenges they face in terms of poverty, security and governance, it will be interesting to see whether Nile cooperation can be treated, in a positive way, with the level of priority it deserves. Visionary leaders, whatever their other faults and policy mistakes, will be those who understand and work very hard to make this initiative work.

SUMMARY

The above all points for the need for an NBI-type institutional solution to the potential development and security improvement possibilities that the Nile could represent for the sub-region. In terms of conflict management directly, it is clear that the NBI has been developed with an underlying strategy of dealing incrementally with the relational as well as objective complexities. To this point the main emphasis is on the *Shared Vision* aspect of the NBI, which is basically designed to create an enabling environment for cooperation, which would be the *necessary but not sufficient* condition for regional stability – it is certainly an excellent step for a better future.

Perhaps it is necessary to think of a larger overlaying triangle that deals with the overall geopolitics, with Nile cooperation, represented by its own smaller triangle, being one of the essential elements inside that larger regional security and development triangle. At this point it appears that the Nile, under the Nile Basin Initiative, is being treated by the countries as an "enclave" for better cooperation, because of its strategic importance economically and otherwise. But it is very, very early days. Whether this enclave of hoped-for cooperation can lead to a better overall situation, or whether the overall situation has more of an impact, positive or negative, on the NBI, remains to be seen. Clearly, a better *"situation"* with respect to Nile cooperation should have very strong and positive effects, direct and indirect, on the overall *situation* – directly, as well as by influencing the *attitudinal* and *behavioral* dimensions of regional relations.

So far their emphasis has been at the technocratic level; the level of political engagement has been more cautious. Now that NBI is at the point of setting up major institutions and projects (in the order of over US$ 200 million) it will entail much bigger tests of the political will and cohesion. In the next year or so, the NBI will begin to become less an interest mainly for Water Ministers and their technocrats and more for the military and political inner circles of these countries.

In the meantime, public participation represents another major challenge that the NBI has barely dealt with so far. This is important inherently as well as for so-called practical purposes. Major change at the macro-level (regional co-operation) needs widespread support from the public. In addition, dealing with micro-level issues (e.g., particular projects and their environmental impact) is also part of the enabling environment for ongoing progress at the macro level. The NBI "Pillar C" -- *Stakeholder Involvement and Confidence Building* -- is meant to address these issues. This is one of the most critical and exciting, but probably still the least developed, aspects of the NBI. It will be interesting to watch how this develops and whether the NBI Secretariat can make it one of its core competencies.

Introductory comments by Tag El Khazin for the session "South Sudan: Scenario for self-determination and impact on Nile Waters status quo-Over view."

- Self-determination is integral and fulcrum to both the IGAD sponsored process and the Asmara declaration of the NDA. Along the years and with the prolonged atrocities and devastation of the population of south Sudan, the sentiments of the majority of southern Sudanese lies with self-determination leading to separation or confederation as minimum acceptable. With some this is a conviction and with others it is the result of frustration.
- The Government of Sudan is backing out of their commitment to negotiate the right for self-determination. The current Government of Sudan never had the majority, the people's mandate or the legitimacy to commit the Sudanese people to such a far-reaching and controversial agenda. The SPLA with its marriage of convenience with the crumbling NDA, adopts two party lines; one of unity and one of separation. They play the tune of the appropriate line for the occasion.
- In case self-determination becomes a reality. In case that reality leads to separation, which it would do under the current conditions and sentiments, we need to ask ourselves several key questions: Can south Sudan be a viable state? Being land-locked and riddled with deep-rooted tribal conflict and rivalries, can it sustain itself as a state even if it separates? Would its demolished and initially weak infrastructures and systems support a state until development is in progress? Like Eritrea, having a small population (5-6 million if all southerners go back to the south) and high illiteracy and poor professional and vocational training, can the south have the necessary critical mass for development and its sustainability? Can the south as a state handle the insurmountable problems of repatriation, rehabilitation and reintegration in addition to demobilization of the fighting forces? 65% of southern Sudanese are no longer living in the south. The total fighting forces are estimated at 40,000.
- The oil factor is not a historical factor in the conflict, but it has complicated the scene. The oil is in Nuer land and there is currently no oil in Dinka land. The SPLA is predominately Dinka. The *Sudd* waters are also in predominantly Nuer, Dinka and Shulluk land. Can this massive potential wealth be shared equitably and peacefully without fuelling fresh violence?
- The *Sudd* water was an igniter in the 1983 civil war. While Jonglie canal (s) initiative was dreamed in 1904-05 and other water projects proposed in 1928-1946-1952, it was until 1979-80 that actual digging of the canal started aimed at delivering 4.7 bill cu m of water at Malakal and 3.8 bill cu m at Aswan. That would have been divided equally between Sudan and Egypt according to the 1959 agreement.
- If the south separates, the estimated 42-bill cu m of water of the *Sudd, which are not of the running water of the Nile*, would be an over-ground national wealth of the south.
- The possible near future needs of the south, if it separates, would be mainly to irrigate the Sobat valley. That would probably need between 1.5 to 2-bill cu m of water. This is about 8-10% of the current total share of Sudan now.
- Sobat is not of the same importance for Ethiopia as the Blue Nile. It is far south, and there

is hardly any infrastructure in the Baro, Gilo and Akobo Rivers vicinity. Other than Gambella with its airport, Ethiopian Jikau and Toto, there is little urban life. Sobat originates partly from Sudan as well.

- Another potential source of conflict if the south separates is the River Kiir or Bahr El Arab. The nomads of western Sudan need to move between Bahr El Arab and River Lul during the dry season.

Introductory comments by Dr. Vern Redekop for the brainstorming session "What measures and processes relating to Nile waters can be adopted by the Horn countries to mitigate the risk of conflict, current or future?"

A relational system makes it imperative that groups of people interact with one another because of something that brings them together. Some relational systems bring people of the same family, clan or ethnic group together. At times it is based on a shared border or a common commercial enterprise. In the case of the Nile Basin it is a common interest in the waters of the Nile that bring a number of peoples and nations into a relational system.

Relational systems can be characterized by different patterns of interaction. On the one hand they may be subject to mimetic structures of violence. Mimetic, in that people imitate one another. Structures in that they are ongoing entrenched and dynamic patterns. Violence, in that people are working to the detriment of each other. Mimetic structures of violence tend to be closed, confining, lacking in options and ultimately death-oriented.

Another option is mimetic structures of blessing—imitative patterns leading to mutual empowerment and well-being suggested by the Arabic and Hebrew cognates *barakat* and *barach*. These tend to be open, creative and generative of new life-oriented options.

These two structures are illustrated in the story of a person who went on to their afterlife and visited hell and heaven. In hell were gloomy starving people surrounding tables of food. The problem was that their eating utensils were longer than their arms so they couldn't get food into their mouths. In heaven happy well-fed people surrounded similar tables. They too had long eating utensils; the only difference was they were feeding each other.

One way of looking at the roundtable is to frame the challenge as follows: how can mimetic structures of blessing be introduced into the Nile Basin so that the peoples of the region can "feed one another."

On Conflict Resolution

Individuals and groups are driven into conflict, according to John W. Burton, by a threat to human identity need satisfiers. As can be seen in the figure below, these identity needs can be thought of as needs for meaning (including justice), connectedness (belonging), an ability to take significant action (control of social and physical environment), security and recognition. Threats to these needs will prompt anger, sadness, depression, fear and emptiness respectively.

Identity Needs Implicated In Deep-Rooted Conflict



E. Vern Routhill Rodopp, Ph.D., conflict studies, prepared by Christian Bellehumeur and Guillaume Thierret, Saint Paul University, Ottawa

For those living in the Nile Basin, the Nile is an important identity need satisfier in each of these need categories. It stands to reason that discourse around the Nile would be filled with emotion.

Another dimension of deep-rooted conflict involves structures of dominance or control referred to below as hegemonic structures. These structures have a physical component—people are forced to comply with the wishes of the dominant; a political component—different people have different rights; an economic component—the wealth is concentrated with the dominant as are the economic rewards of action; a linguistic or identity component—language is used to keep people in their place; and a dominating spirit.

Hegemonic Structures



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When everyone interiorizes and accepts a hegemonic structure, there is a sense of harmony, though not necessarily justice. As those who are subjected become conscious of what is happening, they want to change the structure and this complicates life for the dominant. Managing the multifaceted changes needed to bring peoples to a new equilibrium takes wisdom, tact and attentiveness to the implications for the identity needs of each party.

In the process of dealing with the management of Nile waters, there may be many hegemonic structures established on the basis of expertise, land title, historic agreements, etc. It is important to try to involve representatives of all groups of people in affected regions in shaping the actions to be taken in relation to water use and distribution.

Vern Neufeld Redekop

Identity Needs Implicated In Deep-Rooted Conflict

For those living in the Nile Basin, the Nile is an important identity need satisfier in each of these need categories. It stands to reason that discourse around the Nile would be filled with emotion.

Another dimension of deep-rooted conflict involves structures of dominance or control referred to below as hegemonic structures. These structures have a physical component—people are forced to comply with the wishes of the dominant; a political component—different people have different rights; an economic component—the wealth is concentrated with the dominant as are the economic rewards of action; a linguistic or identity component—language is used to keep people in their place; and a dominating spirit.

Hegemonic Structures



When everyone interiorizes and accepts a hegemonic structure, there is a sense of harmony, though not necessarily justice. As those who are subjected become conscious of what is happening, they want to change the structure and this complicates life for the dominant. Managing the multifaceted changes needed to bring peoples to a new equilibrium takes wisdom, tact and attentiveness to the implications for the identity needs of each party.

In the process of dealing with the management of Nile waters, there may be many hegemonic structures established on the basis of expertise, land title, historic agreements, etc. It is important to try to involve representatives of all groups of people in affected regions in shaping the actions to be taken in relation to water use and distribution.

Vern Neufeld Redekop

Introductory comments by Bernard Taylor for the session "What measures, processes and projects relating to Nile Waters can be adopted by the Horn Countries to reduce their dependence on rain-fed food production without creating tension?

- Solutions to the question of food security in Horn countries must *in part be regional*. We have talked about regional food stocks and central to this scenario is the free flow of food across borders to help redress occasional or endemic food production imbalances. This does of course happen automatically at a local level, but there must be regional agreements on this question. Trade issues can easily raise tensions and contribute to conflict. Take for example the question of Eritrean imports of Ethiopian coffee for onward hard currency-earning export during the mid 1990s - this was an element in the lead up to the Ethiopian-Eritrean war.

- It will be possible to develop further large-scale irrigated food production projects in the region, whether they be in Sudan, Ethiopia or Somalia. A major emphasis should, however, be placed on *small-scale water management* for food production, irrigated crops and the promotion of better health. Most farmers in the region operate at a near subsistence level and water management projects must reach down to them and be controlled by them and their communities.

- It will also be possible to encourage *alternative economic activities* with a view to promoting food security and the local level. In some regions, for example, pieces of land may be more productively used to grow trees destined for sale than to grow food crops, whose existence is threatened by potential drought. The returns from the sale of wood for building and fuel can be significant and can increase a family's economic position. The choice would be that of individual farmers and would be very much determined by current prices for wood sales and food purchases. Good road communications and the free passage of goods are essential elements in such 'specialization' approaches.

- When considering solutions to the question of food security, it's important to remember the principle of *seeking ideas and solutions at the local level*. The example of the Oxfam UK-supported agro-forestry land and water management project in the Yatenga region of Burkina Faso was cited. What began as an NGO-led experiment in planting trees on heavily degraded land was taken up by farmers and converted into a food production initiative. New (in reality *old*) techniques introduced by the NGO were appropriated and improved by farmers and this led to a major locally-inspired initiative that has had a significant impact on land restoration and management in parts of Burkina Faso.

ANNEX I- THEMES

Invitation and themes of the roundtable

Ottawa
June 9, 2001

Re: Invitation to participate in a roundtable at DFAIT in Ottawa Canada on July 3rd.2001
Topic: Management of the Nile Waters and linkage to conflict management and food security in the Horn of Africa.

Time: 9:00 AM to 12:30
1:30 PM to 5:00
Venue: Conference Room A2-217
125 promenade Sussex Drive Ottawa
K1A 0G2

The one-day roundtable, financially facilitated by The Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development (DFAIT), would aim to generate options for the consideration of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) to support their strategies and policies towards the Horn of Africa (HOA). The Horn of Africa Reference and Resource Group (HOA-G) expects to gather 18-20 participants from the Canadian Government, Diplomatic missions, the business community, NGOs, youth, African-Canadians from the Horn, Practitioners and the academia. The options would come out of the roundtable dialogue and brainstorming.

A resource document written by experts would be distributed to the participants ahead of time.

The document would briefly address background information and facts. It would also briefly outline the three themes that the roundtable would address.

First theme:
Explore the current dimensions of the Nile waters politics in the region of the Horn of Africa and brainstorm some guidelines for possible minimum agenda for dialogue between the Nations of the Horn.

The second theme:
Linkage between good and equitable management of the Nile waters and conflict management in the Horn.

The third and last theme:
The possible linkage between the Nile waters and food security in the region.

The resource document is meant to be a suggestive beacon for the one-day event, but the participants would decide how they wish to go about the dialogue and brainstorming. Facilitators would assist the process.

The process would be sensitive to the interests of the 10 countries in the Nile Basin and would not employ itself with complex divisive issues except in a generic form and in specific relevance to the topic of the roundtable.

Interviews with decision-makers and experts from the Horn are likely to be incorporated in the resource document where relevant.

While this is an exercise aimed at generating options for the consideration of the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, and would be conducted as such, The HOA-G is keen to raise the awareness of the Canadian private companies of the potential in hydro related businesses in the Horn. It is hoped that the risks and business community concerns thereof would emerge either implicitly or explicitly. HOA-G also hopes to generate real interest in the Canadian quarters to help them to develop a more positive and active outlook towards the HOA. Food security is part of the current Human Security Initiative endorsed by the Canadian Cabinet and it now forms a corner stone in Canada's foreign policy.

CIDA is actively engaged in the Nile Basin Initiative and I understand that CIDA's President is leading the Canadian team to the ICCON meetings in Geneva June 26th-28th. That is, however, a development initiative. The roundtable intends to look at conflict management and food security as primary issues and not only as impacts of development.

Regards

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ANNEX II- LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Roundtable, July 3rd 2001. Nile Waters Management and linkage to Conflict Management and Food Security.

DFAIT, Room A2-217
125 Promenade Sussex Drive
Ottawa
09:00 to 17:00

List of participants who attended and contributed to the event.

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ANNEX III-DAY'S PROGRAM

MANAGEMENT OF NILE WATERS AND LINKAGE TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND FOOD SECURITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

AGENDA: TUESDAY JULY 3, 2001-Room A2-217, 125 Sussex Dr.

09:00-09:15
Registration, setting the table, and networking

09:15-09-25
Opening message and welcoming.
Dr. Vern Redekop

09:25-9:35
Introduction.
Tag El Khazin

9:35-10:05
Dialogue and general discussion about water, conflict, and food security in the Horn. The current situation.
Chair: Alemayehou Seifu.

10:05-10:25
Experiences from other regions around the world with shared water resources.
Chair: Pam Thompson

10:25-10:40
The Nile Basin Initiative. Overview of general regional impact.
Shawn Houlihan

10:40-10:50-Coffee Break

10:50-11:20
First Brainstorming session: Possible Impact of the Subsidiary Action Plan for Eastern Nile (ENSAP) on conflict and food security in the Horn.
Chair: Abdul Rahman Awl.

11:20-11:45
Discussion about national water needs in the three riparian countries of the Horn and the current impediments to satisfying those needs.
Chair: Kathryn White

11:45-12:15
Egypt and the Horn: Nile waters relations, clashing and complimentary approaches.
Chair: Michael Vechsler

12:15-01:15-Lunch-networking

1:15-1:45
Riparian and non-riparian countries of the Horn: How can good management of the Nile Waters impact on the relations of all the 5 countries of the Horn.
Chair: Fessaha Weri

1:45-2:00
South Sudan: Scenario for self-determination and impact on Nile Waters status quo.
Over view
Tag El Khazin

2:00-2:20
Discussion: Chair
David Melvill

2:20-3:00
Second brainstorming session: What measures and processes relating to Nile Waters can be adopted by the Horn countries to mitigate the risk of conflict, current or future?
Chair: Dr. Vern Redekop.

3:00-3:10-Coffee break.

3:10-3:40
Third brainstorming session: What measures processes and projects relating to Nile Waters can be adopted by the Horn countries to reduce their dependence on rain-fed food production without creating tension?
Chair: Bernard Taylor

3:40-4:10
Selecting durable options of the three brainstorming sessions.
Joe Morris and Pam Thompson

4:10-4:30 Review, comments, ideas for follow up.

4:30-4:40
Closure Dr. Vern Redekop
Hughes Simard
Tag El Khazin

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SELECTED CCFPD REPORTS FROM 2000-2001

Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding

Report from the Roundtable: Judges and Peace Operations. CCFPD. March 9, 2001.

Renewing Partnerships for the Prevention of Armed Conflict: Options to Enhance Rapid Deployment and Initiate a UN Standing Emergency Capability. Peter Langille, Global Human Security Ideas and Initiatives. Fall 2000.

Report from the Roundtable on Expert Deployment to International Peace Operations. CCFPD. September 12, 2000.

Canadian Peacebuilding in the Middle East: Case Study of the Canada Fund in Israel/Palestine and Jordan. Tami Amanda Jacoby, University of Manitoba. Fall 2000.

Les enterprises canadiennes et la consolidation de la paix. Jean-Francois Rioux, Francisco-José Valiente, and Christian Geiser, Université du Québec a Montréal. Le 31 octobre 2000.

Nuclear Weapons and Small Arms

The Ottawa Group Report on Small Arms, Light Weapons (SALW) and Non-State Actors. CCFPD and Centre for Defence Studies. November 7-8, 2000.

Ballistic Missiles Foreign Experts Roundtable Report. Ernie Regehr, Project Ploughshares and CCFPD. March 30, 2000.

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Perspectives on the Borderless World: Issues for Canada. Heather Nicol and Ian Townsend-Gault. Fall 2000.

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Report from the Roundtable on Just War and Genocide. CCFPD. December 8-9, 2000.

Report from the Ottawa Roundtable for the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). CCFPD. January 15, 2001.

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Internet address: http://www.ccfpd.ca Fax: (613) 992-0687

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Children and Violent Conflict: Meeting the Challenge of Diversity. Erin Baines, Dalhousie University; Barry Burciul, University of Toronto. Summer 2000.

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Canadian Firms, Canadian Values. Canadian Business for Social Responsibility. May 2000.

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Decentralization and Challenges to Unity: Report on the Indonesia Roundtable 2001. Centre for Dialogue, Simon Fraser University. April 19-21, 2001.

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Commerce international et diversité culturelle: à la recherche d'un difficile équilibre. Ivan Bernier, Université Laval and Dave Atkinson. 2000.

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Roundtable on Northern Foreign Policy: Feedback and Look Ahead. CCFPD. February 5, 2001.

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Gendered Discourses, Gendered Practices: Feminists (Re)Write Canadian Foreign Policy. Claire Turenne Sjolander, University of Ottawa; Heather Smith, University of Northern British Columbia; Deborah Stienstra, University of Winnipeg. May and July 2000.

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